The Errant Aviator

New Kabul International Terminal

2008-03-19T14:33:00.000-07:00

From left, Mr. Sonada, Kabul International Airport new international terminal project manager, Stephen Irwin, Bruce Edwards (both with ICAO), Mr. Rashedi (Kabul Airport Technical President) & an unidentified Japanese engineer.

Air Transport System Course, Dubai, UAE January 20 to 24, 2008

2008-02-01T07:54:00.000-08:00

My classmates from the recent ACI/ICAO Airport Management Professional Accreditation Program held at ACI�s regional training facility in terminal 1 at Dubai Int�l Airport (DIA) from January 20 to 24, 2008. In addition to executives from airports around the world, pictured to my right are Mohammed Ahli, director-general of DCAA and DIA CEO Paul Griffiths.

Thanksgiving in Kabul

2007-11-24T21:08:00.001-08:00

Accommodations for U.S. Military Personnel

2007-10-15T00:28:00.000-07:00

The recent PR disaster at OAK could have been easily resolved by airport management with just three simple questions when the charter aircrafts pilot notified ground handling company Hilltop Aviation (who in turn notified airport management) that "the parking and passenger handling provisions did not meet expectations." There are really three issues here, Security Screening, Customs/Immigration/Agriculture Clearance and Weapons on Board.

1. Were your passengers screened?

The Port's statement about this aircraft not being "TSA-screened at their originating airport" belies their lack of understanding of the processes involved in airport security. TSA doesn't screen embarking passengers in Iraq, Afghanistan, Paris, London or Rome, etc. TSA or ICAO compliant screening is the standard that must be met and that's normally provided by local nationals operating in their own jurisdiction. At some overseas military airfields and commercial airports, ICAO compliant security screening (and often U.S. Customs, Immigration and Agriculture preclearance as well) is performed by U.S. military personnel under authority of DoA and DHS and by agreement with the host nation under a status of forces agreement. Whoever does it, designated U.S. military or host nation personnel, the screening is done and the pilot would have been aware of it. Even if they hadn't been screened, they still could have been bussed to the front of the terminal and given access to the non-sterile area facilities to meet and greet, get something to eat, use the restrooms or whatever.

2. Were your passengers processed by Customs, Immigration and Dept. of Agriculture officers (or their designates)?

This charter began as an international flight but was on a domestic segment due to its stopover at JFK (as first Port of Entry into US) where everyone reportedly cleared Customs and Immigration. This flights passengers could have been cleared either at origination or at JFK (see above). The pilot would have had documentation to prove this. Most military charters operate under FAR Part 121 Supplemental rules and as such are subject to most of the same requirements as any commercial flight.

3. We understand you have weapons on board, are they being brought in in accordance with TSA protocols?

Accommodations for U.S. Military Personnel
http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/airtravel/assistant/editorial_1880.shtm

Loaded weapons are not carried aboard military charter flights (Unlike many commercial flights operating everyday where air marshalls and/or flight crew may be armed). On military charters, weapons are unloaded and secured, usually in the belly of the aircraft along with the ammunition. The pilot or troop commander would have had documentation to prove this. I Googled and found the above link in less than a minute, they could have too.

I chalk all of this up to poor training and direction from above. OAK receives these charter flights regularly and should have written guidance on how to handle these sorts of problems a long time ago. I dare say, if you were to ask to see any guidance provided to staff on this topic, you'll find none (or certainly none dated prior to Sept. 27th.) To be fair, everybody can't know everything, that's why written guidance and regular training is important.

Who cares what the airline or ground handler told the airport in advance? Airport management was presented with a problem in real-time and they handled it in less than sterling fashion. One would hope that this airport management doesn't require advance coordination of a crash or other emergency in order to handle it properly. One would think these highly qualified individuals exhibiting an ability to think on their feet is why they make the big bucks. I'm not a big believer in excuses and I don't think most people respect leaders whose first impulse is to try and deflect responsibility. The spin machine put in to place after this incident is a poor substitute for anticipating problems before they occur.

Part of the Port's apology referenced how many staff and local leaders had themselves served in the military. All I can say is it must have been a very long time since any of them deployed outside the Bay Area.

Also, in future, airport spokespersons might want to coordinate their alibi with TSA before using them as an excuse. The feds left the Port swinging in the breeze on this hot potatoe issue.

Luckily for the Port, most media outlets know relatively little about the inner workings of an airport or they might have suffered even more negative press. If I were them, I wouldn't count on that being the case forever. Bluffing your way through this relatively complex business will only get you so far.

Three questions, asked and answered, and this never would have made the papers and these honorable citizens would have been treated with the full respect they deserve. Airport management made this much more difficult than it needed to be.

OAK is many things, but anti-military isn't one of them. People need to look elsewhere for the real answer to why this happened. However, if they're as sincere in their committment to the troops as they say, how come OAK is currently the only one of the three Bay Area airports without a USO? Surely they could spare a little space and perhaps help with some volunteer staffing if as the Port spokesperson says, "All of us here at OAK proudly serve and support our nation's military service men and women and their families. They are always treated with the highest level of respect and we go out of our way to ensure that their travel experience through OAK is in line with our very high customer service standards."

Related Stories:

Oakland airport scrambles to explain why it kept Marines on tarmac
http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg42498.html

Port of Oakland Statement Regarding a Military Charter Flight Which Operated at OAK on Sept. 27
http://www.oaklandairport.com/press_releases_detail.cfm?ID=495

Oakland airport miscues sparked delay for Marines
http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg42531.html

TSA Statement on Incident Involving U.S. Troops at Oakland International Airport
http://www.tsa.gov/press/happenings/oakland.shtm

Editorial: Marines' airport mixup misreported by media
http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg42532.html

Things Aren't Always What They Seem (or, Who's Running This Airport, Anyway?)

2007-09-13T23:29:00.000-07:00

Several months ago an airport director of a large airport in the Midwest announced he was leaving after less than two years on the job. The reason given was that he wanted to spend more time with his family. The truth, it now appears, was that the high school educated deputy director he found himself forced to work with was an embarrassment to himself and his organization. This deputy has been arrested for DUI and has reportedly come to work under the influence on more than one occasion. Aside from the demoralizing effect this kind of behavior has on staff, this dysfunctional facility has suffered from a lack of professional leadership and technical innovation in the last few years. This airport has been on a downhill slide for some time now and fails to impress most who pass through its concourses. Low expectations, nepotism and a failure to lead by example are the hallmarks of this organization. The recently departed director, cognizant of the relatively small community of airport professionals we must all live among, wisely decided to leave on a pretext rather than come right out and say what the real problem was.

You might ask yourself why this director, rather than quit in frustration, didn't simply fire this unqualified albatross left over from a previous administration and go on to revitalize this important airport?

The dirty little secret is, his deputies brother, the mayor, wouldn't allow it.

That airport and this community deserves much better than this. Public-use airports should not be used as dumping grounds for politically connected hacks whose first allegiance is not to the airport, Director or flying public but rather to their political sponsor. And how objective can a performance evaluation be when written for someone with connections downtown?

In many cities, airports are an attractive target for political interference and most airport directors serve at the will of elected officials. Directors are often faced with a choice between playing ball or losing their job. Revenue diversion laws prevent the most onerous forms of milking the cash cow that many airports represent but clever politicians find new ways to get their fingers in the till. The recent story about Houston conducting a no-bid renewal of an airport concessionaires contract for a politically connected businessman is just the latest example of behavior at odds with a free market society. Who would have thought that could happen in Texas?

Truth As A Tactic

2007-08-03T06:24:00.000-07:00

Two recent incidents have reinforced my belief that some in this industry, entrusted with the public's safety and security, believe that spinning the facts is an acceptable way of meeting their obligations to the people they serve (No, I'm not talking about the airlines here, I refer to the travelling public).

The first occurred several weeks ago, as an airport I've written about before, suffered yet another security breach in a long string of security breaches dating back to 9/11. Now one would think they'd learn from their mistakes, take corrective action and reduce or eliminate the considerable impact these things have on everybody concerned. But no, faced with a choice between doing the right thing and gaming the system, they simply decided to stop following long established security protocols. You see, they think the protocol is the problem, not the fact that they seem unable to prevent or reduce the number of breaches. Something that didn't make the papers is the fact that they refused to evacuate the terminals and rescreen everybody even though local law enforcement assigned to this airport advised they do so. The breach was classic and nearly identical to several others that have occurred at this airport and others. An individual walked right past a TSO, through the exit lane, and in to the sterile area. The person was never found which makes it difficult to understand how a TSA spokesperson could later say they determined the individual was not a threat. They 'determined' this by running bomb dogs around the crowded terminals. You don't need to be Karnak, or a rocket scientist to know bomb dogs are worthless when it comes to finding knives (including box cutters), guns and several types of explosives and bomb components. If running bomb sniffer dogs through a crowd was an acceptable substitute for physical screening, why is every airport in the country using checkpoints with x-ray and trace detection equipment?

Now what would cause local officials to act so callously when dealing with the security of the people they serve? These folks have families, they're not evil or uncaring. The problem is they don't believe another attack will happen, or at least (they tell themselves) not at their airport. They convince themselves that the risks don't justify the expense. The dilemma here is that they've decided to offer a lesser standard of security at this airport, and in so doing make it a more attractive target for terrorists, without consulting the people most affected by it, their passengers. Putting aside the fact that they're failing to follow a well established TSA security protocol, it seems the least they could do is ask the people who use their facility what they think so they can make an informed choice.

Not Good For Business

Not surprisingly, airports don't like disruptions, and security breaches rank right at the top for impacting everybody, and this airport is no different. Airport management at this facility believes it's not their call to evacuate terminals. They are only too happy to let the TSA take the heat for failing to follow their own protocols. These airport managers accept no responsibility for the security of their customers, that's TSA's job, they believe. They don't demand their FSD follow the protocol, they don't call TSA HQ to complain, they don't advise other airports that they might have compromised their sterile areas. They're happy with the way things are, so they do nothing. They believe they demonstrated due diligence but would their terrorism insurance underwriter agree? The saddest part of this situation is that their security 'shortcut' of running the dogs around took longer to accomplish than past evacuations/rescreenings. It actually took longer to do it the wrong way than the safe way. So much for logic.

Sky Harbor Spin

The other incident that leaves me wondering if truth will ever find a home at TSA is the recent discovery by local news media that Sky Harbor's checkpoints were being staffed by a private security vendor in the middle of the night for the last two years. Guards were observed waving airport staff, concessionaires and delivery people through checkpoints into the sterile area without any physical inspection of their person or property. All these people had approved badges so this was consistent with current TSA rules but screening of employees is a hot topic of debate and the subject of pending federal legislation. As far as this part of the story goes, Sky Harbor's arrangement is not unusual. The problem was, contrary to TSA rules, the sterile areas were not being swept for contraband prior to control of the checkpoints being returned to TSA each morning. Bad enough, but it gets worse. Reports that these same private guards were often observed sleeping on the job means anybody carrying anything could have gained access to terminal sterile areas and then subsequently on to aircraft. Add to that the fact that the airport wasn't doing a sweep prior to the hand back to the feds and you have to wonder how acting FSD Michael Aguilar could possibly say, "The safety and security of the public has never been in question or jeopardy." Effectively, the Sky Harbor sterile areas stopped being sterile from the first time a security guard took a nap until this problem was discovered, potentially as long as two years. And how often are we going to hear the 'layers of protection' speech whenever a major embarrassment occurs? It generally goes something like, 'Yes, we had a problem but it doesn't really matter because we have these 'layers', you see, some of them so secret that if I told you about them I'd have to kill you.' Well, I've seen these 'layers' and every one of them has failed at one time or another. Every layer contains an element of, 'this isn't all that critical 'cause one of the other layers will catch it if I miss something. Every layer needs to function like the last line of defense.

Can I make a suggestion? When these things happen, tell the media that mistakes were made and the issues are being addressed. Then fix the problem. Is that really so hard to do?

Airport Security - The Chaser

2007-06-12T05:26:00.000-07:00

Where Was the Adult Supervision?

2007-06-10T20:59:00.000-07:00

It's been a bad couple of weeks for security at Birmingham Airport in the UK. Media reports security staff sleeping on the job, reading newspapers instead of watching the x-ray screening monitors at the checkpoints and just generally not giving a crap about doing their jobs.

It's too easy to dump all this on the employees alone. Keep in mind that one of the security supervisors there was the one that blew the whistle on this mess. You have to ask yourself how the media was able to see all this over the course of their six-month investigation while airport, airline and security contractor management could not. And, of course, where was government oversight? We often complain about the intrusiveness (and occasional unfairness) of the media when reporting on our industry but if we don't do our jobs, we deserve to be embarrassed. We can spend our time refining our PR spin on security (i.e. 'Passengers were never in any danger', blah, blah, blah) or we can actually try to do a better job. I'm not naive, I understand the enormous commercial pressures placed on airport managers to keep those lines moving, those flights on time. In the UK's privatized airport environment, this may have simply been an attempt to keep costs down and profits up. In a variation on the same theme, in the U.S., the motivation for similar behavior may be that many municipalities live and die based on the business and tourist dollars delivered via the local airport. Somehow, we need to impress upon those who oversee our work (often politically connected appointees with strong ties to local business) that security failure is not an option, that the financial impact of another 9/11 would be catastrophic. In the absence of a successful attack in the last five years, flyer's have come to believe they're safe. Another terrorist attack using aviation would cause people to not only question airport security itself but the institutions responsible for it. And I doubt the public will be in any mood for the finger pointing by industry that often follows a disaster. People are going to blame everybody connected with the process. For those of you that think we've already gone overboard with security post 9/11, you don't want to know what airport security will look like after another attack. The smart business approach is to not see security as an impediment to aviation but rather as an enabler. Cutting security corners to improve your bottom line will likely not achieve the desired result over the long term. If you're unsure of that, I suggest you check with your terrorism insurance underwriter or a bond rating agency (S&P, Moody's or Fitch) for guidance. This is a risk management issue you can't afford to get wrong. Any attempt to shift this liability burden to government (and, you guessed it, the taxpayers) as some have suggested, should include language making deliberate contravention of established security policy by management (airport, airline & security vendors) a criminal matter punishable by prison time and/or fines (No municipal employee exemption). Harsh, I know, but tell me another way that will guarantee the result? It's time to get serious about security.

This Birmingham problem is evidence of the backsliding phenomenon human beings inevitably engage in. Combine a human intensive, highly repetitive and stressful task with infrequent 'hits' and you can almost graph out the slow decline in effectiveness over time (This is known as prevalence effect by scientists). People just can't do this kind of work, effectively, over a long period of time unless motivated by one or more of the following; another attack (serves to reset the decline in effectiveness graph); the introduction of effective new technology; a process such as ISO or Six Sigma; or extraordinary leadership (Including highly skilled and motivated staff). God knows, none of this is rocket science, we've been through it all before. How many times must we learn this lesson? In this environment, success without sustainability is worthless.

Congressman Bennie Thompson (D-MS) was right in calling for a cessation of flights from Birmingham to the U.S. until this problem is fixed (And I don't mean just fire all the 'bad' employees and pretend that fixes everything). As we all know, entry into one airports sterile area is essentially access in to all airports sterile areas worldwide. Will you sleep any better tonight knowing that some folks connecting through U.S. airports were screened at Birmingham?

Related Stories:

British Airport Security Who Would Rather Read, Sleep Than X-Ray Bags
http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg41109.html

Birmingham Airport security an 'Achilles heel'
http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg41164.html

Birmingham Airport security staff suspended
http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg41148.html

US calls for action over airport security scandal
http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg41134.html

Birmingham Airport security condemned (August, 2004)
http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg31641.html

Birmingham Airport Screeners 'Played Game on Screen' (June, 2003)
http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg26559.html

Listen to my recent interview with British publication Passenger Terminal Today at the following address: http://www.passengerterminaltoday.com/stephen_irwin.html

Airport Security & the DC Shuffle

2007-04-19T03:35:00.000-07:00

I have noticed that nothing I have never said ever did me any harm.
- Calvin Coolidge

Notwithstanding our former presidents sage advice, I couldn't help but notice that some of the alphabet groups representing our industry are frantically trying to stave off recently proposed new federal legislation. H.R. 1413, introduced by Rep's Ginny Brown-Waite and Nita M. Lowey, would require TSA to implement 100% screening of airport employees. TSA, AAAE, ACI-NA and NATA announced yesterday in Washington, "A six-point plan to tighten the screening of airport employees and prevent security risks like the gun-smuggling incident at Orlando International Airport."

The six measures are:

Training all airport employees -- not just TSA employees -- to recognize hostile intent
Raising awareness among airport employees of suspicious behavior and implementing incentives for reporting anomalies.
Increasing TSA's random employee screening measures to include roving security patrols.
Expanding the use of fingerprint, iris, limited access and recorded access control measures.
Creating a new level of employees that would be subject to more rigorous, initial scrutiny on a voluntary basis.
Continue to support the development of security technology including cameras and body imaging.

This isn't so much policy as a promise to come up with a policy. This announcement might placate a congressman who doesn't understand the day-to-day reality at U.S. airports but most of us know this is just eyewash. One can't help but conclude that most of these initiatives wouldn't have prevented the incident that precipitated this whole debate. All of these organizations provide a valuable service to our industry, are staffed by good people with good intentions, however, on this issue, we'll have to part company. Let's break it down, point by point ...

Training all airport employees -- not just TSA employees -- to recognize hostile intent

Most airport staff already receive training. ASP's currently mandate SIDA training that includes badge challenges and reporting of suspicious activity. Perhaps the message here is that now, we want them to really, really do what they've always been asked to do. Teaching fuelers, baggage handlers, mechanics and others to look for 'hostile intent' on the ramp is laughable. Most of these folks perform difficult physical labor for not much more than minimum wage and often poor or non-existent benefits, experience high attrition, work in all kinds of weather and are constantly being pressed by their supervisors to hurry up. I expect at one time or another during their shifts, all of them exhibit some degree of hostility.

Raising awareness among airport employees of suspicious behavior and implementing incentives for reporting anomalies.

This, obviously, isn't a fully formed thought. What 'raising awareness among airport employees of suspicious behavior' entails isn't clear. It seems like a restatement of the first point using different language. Airport employees are busy people, rushing from office or workshop to planeside, storeroom to commissary. Getting through their shift and going home are what occupies their minds most days. Efforts to convince employees that security is everyone's responsibility have met with varying degrees of success. Some may still believe they're not paid enough to do both their job and TSA's. 'Implementing incentives for reporting anomalies' I suppose suggests some sort of time-off or financial rewards for reporting suspicious stuff. That might help some (If people don't game it) but I think you'll find that many folks in these kinds of jobs come from a kind of 'mind your own business and I'll mind mine' culture. Everybody has heard the stories of FAA CASFO Special Agents in the old days getting anywhere they wanted to go on the ramp wearing a SIDA badge with a picture of Micky Mouse on it. I don't think things have changed that much.

Increasing TSA's random employee screening measures to include roving security patrols.

The second element, roving security patrols, in conjunction with 100% employee screening, could actually help. AOA perimeter security is a major vulnerability at many airports. The basic problem with this particular point though, is there's a lot more of them (airport employees) than there are TSA inspectors at any given time and they would likely see TSA coming a ways off. Nobody knows all the nooks and crannies of an airport better than the folks that work there. And think about it, carrying stuff around is what many of these folks do for a living so what would prompt TSA staff to stop this guy versus that one? TSA inspectors aren't the only ones capable of monitoring movements and behavior, it's true, but employees determined to do something wrong will likely turn those abilities towards watching for patterns or complacency on the part of inspectors. For example, all inspectors would need to do is make it obvious they take their lunch or breaks at the same time every shift and you've created an instant vulnerability. A baggage handler, working with a confederate, could drive by a remote section of AOA fenceline at most airports, have his buddy throw a parcel containing anything over from the other side, and have it onboard an airplane in a matter of minutes. And what if the confederate is a TSA inspector? It's not like we haven't heard about dishonest TSA staff before, stealing from checked and carry-on baggage. I don't think it's a stretch to imagine them participating in something more nefarious. And with the ever ubiquitous cell phone, how difficult would it be for an employee on the secure side of an airport to call back to their fellow employee on the non-secure side and tell them at which doors the TSA were checking folks? We really need to stop thinking of terrorists as idiots and fools. Anyone prepared to kill themselves in the furtherance of their cause is a formidable opponent and should be treated as such.

Expanding the use of fingerprint, iris, limited access and recorded access control measures.

Biometrics and access control systems alone do little to solve the ongoing problem at most airports of 'piggybacking'. Employees, if they even notice, may allow someone behind them to grab the door before it closes and pass through as long as they seem 'ok' (in some sort of uniform with some sort of badge). Biometrics tied to a turnstile type device might help put a stop to this. Still, we're years away from installing that in all commercial airports. Introducing technology designed to help catch a perpetrator after the fact, obviously, isn't an optimal solution. In most cases, the damage will have already been done. Emphasis must be placed on pre-emptive technologies. Of course, all the biometrics and access control in the world won't help if an employee doesn't enter secured areas through established entry points. At some airports, gaining access to aircraft parking aprons is as simple as getting your feet wet by walking along a shoreline.

Creating a new level of employees that would be subject to more rigorous, initial scrutiny on a voluntary basis.

Not clear what they're getting at here. Haven't we been told for the last six years that we didn't need 100% screening of employees precisely because of the current extensive background checks? Is this an admission that that wasn't true? What will we be told six years from now? I don't mean to stereotype anyone but, based on my experience, not everyone schlepping bags and fueling planes at an airport is a choir boy (or girl), but that doesn't make them terrorists. I wonder if the two Comair employees at OIA would have sailed through this, 'more rigorous, initial scrutiny'. And what good is it anyway if it's 'voluntary'?

Continue to support the development of security technology including cameras and body imaging.

What, were they not going to do this if not for this initiative? This is just boilerplate to fill space and sound like something new. Five points didn't seem impressive enough so they added this.

A close look makes one wonder what the real objective of this announcement is. They were clearly struggling to string together something that appeared meaningful. I can almost see the public policy wonks huddled together and saying if we don't "fix" this problem, Congress will. We better come up with something, anything, quick to get them off our backs. The main problem is, these initiatives do not comport with the requirements of the original statute (ATSA - Section 106) that mandated TSA provide a level of screening comparable to that provided for passengers. There's nothing 'comparable' about random screening and if TSA really believed that it was, then why make Registered Traveler participants, who must undergo background checks like employees do, be 100% screened? This proposal is just more of the same "layers" repackaged. Random employee inspections didn't prevent the OIA gun smuggling in 2004 or last month from happening, and these 'new' proposals aren't likely to work either. It would seem that TSA believes the only employees that should be screened 100% of the time are cockpit and cabin crew. The ones, in most peoples estimation, least likely to bring down a plane. And, if you think about it, a pilot doesn't need to sneak anything past security to accomplish that.

What is our obligation to the people that traverse our concourses everyday? Who do we consider our 'customers', the airlines, passengers, both? It's an awesome responsibility, in many ways like being mayor of a small city. Most people moving through our terminals have no idea if we're meeting our obligations to provide a safe and secure facility, but we do, we know. Airports are a business, but they're also a public service. Let's not allow commercial interests to affect our judgement on this critical issue. Nobody wants to be the Director at an airport used to launch another attack. Let's do the right thing even if it is a pain in the butt. Miami and Orlando are doing it now, so it is doable. Let's not require this change to be written in blood.

I would seem to be in good company in the belief that 100% screening of employees is a smart thing to do. Just one month after 9/11, no less a personage than Jane Garvey, former head of the FAA stated, "The goal must be, for all of us," Garvey said, "that the end result is 100 percent screening of all passengers, of baggage, and of airport and airline personnel."

Since I began this post with a quote, let me close it with one more from someone I believe most of us in this industry respect and admire.

"I think a greater challenge for all of us is the experience in the aftermath of Pan Am 103, when we all believed that the nature of aviation security had been changed forever and people would adapt and would accept any burden. It wasn't a year afterward, after the new legislation had been enacted that airlines, airports, other interest groups were lobbying against tougher regulations, keeping public acceptance of inconvenience, intrusiveness into their lives at a high level is the challenge for an open democratic society. Maybe this time, maybe if we call the surcharge fund the September 11 fund and remind people every day that our vigilance can never be lowered, that we'll be able to sustain a high level of acceptance and participation and willingness by the public to continue to travel and accept the inconveniences."

REP. JAMES OBERSTAR (D-MN)
September 27, 2001 Interview Conducted by Ray Suarez on PBS's The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer

Related Story:

Miami airport safe despite smuggling - officials (Aug. - 1999)
http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg01453.html

Why Everyone Must Be Screened
http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg38630.html

TSA Speak (Blog)
http://www.californiaaviation.org/weblog/2007/03/tsa-speak

Editorial: Getting it wrong
http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg40682.html

Ethics and Our Industry

2007-04-14T00:13:00.001-07:00

This poll is completely anonymous and non-scientific. No one will ever know your responses so please answer honestly. You may participate only once. Comments are optional on the next page.

TSA Speak - Partie Deux

2007-04-05T06:14:00.000-07:00

A week ago there was a report in the Denver media titled, 'Undercover agents slip bombs past DIA screeners'. The article describes the results of recent testing by TSA's 'Red Team', inspectors specially trained to ... act and think like terrorists to find vulnerabilities in the aviation security system. The crux of the piece was that DIA's screeners had often failed to detect contraband being brought through the checkpoints by the covert agents. The article goes on to explain how the 'Red Team' has consistently uncovered poor performance across the country over the course of the last several years. Contained within that article was an admission by a TSA spokesperson which ought to be a wake-up call to all of us:

'The security chief [Morris] says he expects screeners to fail the Red Team tests because they are difficult.'

'Morris says other agents, not with the Red Team, test and train screeners every day at the nation's 450 airports and says screeners pass most of those tests. In those kinds of tests, he said Denver has done well in the past.'

Let me see if I understand the TSA spokesman. The problem is the 'Red Team' tests are too hard (read: too much like the real thing) but that screeners have no problem passing the tests done in-house conducted by their own local inspectors.

We're backsliding. This is the same sort of self (and public) deception the industry engaged in pre-9/11. Apparently our aviation security strategy is based primarily on the hope that the terrorists aren't as smart as the 'Red Team' (or DHS-IG inspectors, apparently). Don't count on it. Telling ourselves there isn't a problem doesn't make it so.

Since I've taken the above remarks out of context, I'll leave you to judge whether I've been fair after reading the piece in it's entirety.

One wonders if we haven't already reached the upper limits of human performance in this type of work. Despite considerable effort and investment, the numbers don't appear to be improving. Ninety-percent screening failure rates are simply unacceptable. It may be time to shift emphasis to other methods. All the current system does is keep honest people honest, a modern day Potemkin village, providing virtually no protection from terrorists determined to do us harm. If, (some experts say when) the next terrorist attack directed against aviation occurs, we won't be able to say we didn't know. The failed, 'feel good', aviation security system which existed before 9/11 was widely known to industry insiders and government. If it happens again, what will we say to the victims?

Approaching Critical Mass at TSA

2007-03-29T18:59:00.002-07:00

The Current Situation

43,000 FTE staffing cap

New Requirements
Random inspections of employees in Secure areas
Enhanced inspections of TSA staff
More passengers being screened as enplanements grow annually at approx. 5%

Consequences

Same staff + more work = either increasing throughput (with a corresponding increase in screening mistakes) or increasing wait times for passengers

The periodic screener reallocations conducted by TSA will likely favor airports growing at or above the national average (5%) at the expense of airports experiencing slower growth in enplanements, in effect, "Robbing Peter to pay Paul." The net result will be all airports increasingly effected by screener shortages with slow-growing airports hit hardest.

What the Future Holds

TSA will continue to do more with less until they begin doing less with less. Some might argue that process has already begun. TSA must become less reliant on staff and accelerate technology integration to augment the very necessary but fallible human component.

At U.S. airports, it's speed over security

http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg39349.html

Survey: Travelers Uninterested in Registered Traveler Program, Despite Frustration With Long Airport Security Lines

http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg40476.html

One billion US fliers predicted per year by 2015

http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg40475.html

TSA Speak

2007-03-26T05:30:00.000-07:00

The Orlando Sentinel ran a story on Sunday, March 25, 2007 titled, "Airport Security Duties Can Fall Between Cracks". In it, a TSA spokesperson said the following, "Doing 100 percent of anything just to hit a statistical goal is not the best use of resources," Koshetz said. "TSA moves in a flexible, unpredictable fashion to address vulnerabilities with a layered security approach. If you harden any one point, the enemy will engineer around it, so you have to be smart about it."

One has to wonder who the intended audience is for a statement like that. Clearly, it can't be airport managers they're talking to. Anyone who's spent more than a few minutes waiting for a flight can tell you that statement makes no sense and doesn't conform to the current reality of airport security. I'll grant you that TSA is unpredictable, but flexible? As for being, 'smart about it', I'll let the facts speak for themselves.

Let's see, we have 100% of passengers being screened (including Registered Traveler subscribers), 100% baggage match, (nearly) 100% of airport meeters and greeters prohibited from entering terminal concourses, 100% background and criminal history checks of new employees working in Secure areas and now implementation of a 2001 law (ATSA) to screen 100% of airport employees entering Secure areas. The spokespersons fondness for effective 'layers' and efficient random (read: hit or miss) sampling doesn't describe the TSA operation I know. And as for, '... the best use of resources' statement, if I were the TSA, I wouldn't bring that up lest people remember how the agency spent hundreds of thousands on enhancements to executive offices and other perks.

The back-story on the recent OIA gun smuggling incident is that nearly the exact same thing happened there in 2004. As a result, TSA stationed staff at all doors leading to Secure areas, inspecting everyone passing through. About 6 months ago, TSA unilaterally pulled their staff off those doors and, surprise, surprise, the gun/drug smugglers were back in business, bringing guns into the cabins of commercial flights. Maybe the 100% approach wasn't such a bad idea, because the random checks that replaced them served as no deterrent at all. The agencies immediate response to the breach that they helped make possible, was to do more of the same, implementing a much publicized three-day 'surge' in random checks by 160 temporary staff brought in for the occasion. Doesn't the same logic that DoD keeps reminding us of in Iraq apply here, let the bad guys know how long you'll be in town and they'll just wait you out? As evidence of the agencies, 'Do as I say, not as I do' regulatory approach, just a month before this most recent breach, a local CBS affiliate did a story about OIA based TSA staff circumventing screening when reentering the sterile area during their assigned shift.

As for consistancy, I still don't understand TSA's rationale for requiring regular security screening of Registered Traveler subscribers (all of whom undergo background checks) prior to flying but opposing regular security screening for employees upon reporting to work each day.

TSA's public pronouncements become more disingenuous and lacking in credability with each passing day. For a real chuckle, read the agencies official comments about the recent Orlando airport gun smuggling story, more remarkable for what isn't said (they didn't have a clue it was happening until the flight departed OIA) than for what is.

It's a shame that many airports, in their efforts to cultivate a good working relationship, are reluctant to criticise this agency on whom they depend so much. This is a federal bureaucracy that regulates its own work, an inherent conflict of interest that doesn't serve the people it's meant to protect.

I'm afraid the area TSA has become most expert in is spin and damage control. TSA is a worthy successor to the FAA, another government agency that failed to protect the American public. Someone needs to remind these civil servants they're there to represent the public interest, not engage in pre-9/11 like 'security theatre'.

Miami airport safe despite smuggling - officials (Aug. - 1999)

A Breach of Trust

2007-03-24T14:59:00.000-07:00

Sunday, February 18, 2007

Recently there were media reports of a security breach at a large Category I airport. The incident reportedly involved a man setting off a magnetometer at a checkpoint then disappearing into the boarding gate area after being asked to undergo secondary screening. Airport staff, according to an airport spokeswoman, then searched for the man, unsuccessfully, before evacuating the terminals and rescreening passengers. This has happened before, at this airport and at others, and will likely happen again. Until screening technology dramatically reduces the need for legions of security staff, human error will, on occasion, allow a breach to occur. Correcting those errors and making it right is the key to maintaining a secure aviation system. As airport managers know, entry into one airports sterile area is potentially access into all airports sterile areas. TSA protocols require the evacuation of 'contaminated' terminal sterile areas, thorough inspection of affected areas and re-screening of passengers. There is currently no other way to return a terminal to 'sterile' status. Passengers are never happy about these inadvertent foul-ups but generally understand the necessity for taking drastic action to keep the system safe.

The problem in this particular incident is that what was reported isn't what actually happened. There was no evacuation, no thorough inspection of the sterile concourses, no passenger rescreening. The incident did begin, as reported in local media, about 1:00 p.m. when a man set off a magnetometer. The man explained to TSA staff that he was wearing a metal leg brace. Following standard procedure, TSA directed the man to move forward to undergo additional (secondary) screening where busy staff apparently lost track of him and he subsequently vanished into the sterile (gates) area. Thirty minutes passed before TSA advised airport management of the breach while aircraft continued to arrive and depart from the terminal, bound for airports all across the country.

When senior airport management subsequently met with senior TSA management to decide on a course of action, they were anxious to avoid a full blown 'terminal dump', minimize embarrassment to the agency and the attendant economic disruption to air carrier operations that would inevitably result. Airlines hate terminal evacuations, it costs them a lot of money, plays havoc with their flight schedule and annoys their passengers. The station manager for the dominant carrier at this facility was pressing the airport and TSA to minimize the disruption. The airport and local TSA agreed to something they came up with called an 'in place inspection', where the terminals would not be evacuated or thoroughly inspected but instead bomb-sniffing dogs would be walked through the passenger filled terminals by law enforcement officers. As you will have already concluded by now, bomb dogs have little chance of identifying an individual that triggered a magnetometer. Magnetometers find metal, bomb dogs find chemicals used to make bombs. Nothing airport and TSA management did that day mitigated the possibility that the individual who entered the checkpoint and set off the alarm had either a knife or gun strapped to his leg. It could also have been a trial run for a future terrorist operation.

The protocol is clear, and is logical if you think about it. If you have a breach of the sterile area (the passenger area beyond the security checkpoints) and you lose sight of the individual, the sterile area has been compromised and you must evacuate passengers, inspect the sterile area for weapons and explosives ('re-sterilize' the sterile area) and then rescreen passengers through the checkpoints back into the terminals. This is the ONLY way to guarantee the safety of the flying public. Not following this protocol at every airport, every time introduces a system-wide vulnerability.

The most troubling part of all this, aside from the airports deliberate attempt to deceive the media, is the arrogance when dealing with the safety of others. The terminals were filled, as they are on most days, with men, women and children, all confident in the belief that their security resided in the hands of competent, concerned management.

Equally troubling is that airport security officials, when approached later by local media for additional details on this incident, replied that they could not respond due to Sensitive Security Information, or SSI considerations. The SSI designation is meant to keep sensitive security information out of the hands of terrorists, not shield official wrongdoing. We've begun to notice with increasing regularity a propensity for some airports and airline spokespersons to simply say, "We do not discuss security matters". When I hear that, my cynics radar kicks in and I wonder what they might be hiding. If this particular airport is any example of the manner in which this public trust is handled, then those that violate security procedures and lie about it should be subjected to the harshest penalties possible. In our business, people need to believe those entrusted with safeguarding their well-being. Commercial considerations should not trump established security protocols. Cutting regulatory corners should not be allowed to become a competitive advantage or else we'll see no end of this kind of behavior. Doing the right thing is always the right thing to do, even when it's inconvenient (or expensive).

Another phrase we're hearing with increased frequency these days is, "Passengers were never in any danger." This is typically uttered as part of an initial airport/airline statement, often delivered before all the facts are in. If the objective is to calm fears, other words should be used to express that sentiment (i.e. 'Everyone at this airport is committed to finding and correcting any errors that lead to today's breach'). Making the, "Passengers were never ..." statement part of an airports initial PR boilerplate can only serve to weaken its impact. And, if subsequent investigation reveals passengers were at risk, you'll be glad you were straight with your audience. It's like credibility in the bank that you may need to draw on another day.

This particular incident is a failure by local officials but it becomes a national failure if something isn't done about it.

One wonders what the insurer that writes this airports terrorism rider to their liability coverage would say if they knew about this extraordinarily poor risk management and massive exposure? Two words come to mind, ... not covered.

It's been said that character is doing what�s right even when nobody is looking. TSA and airport management at this public facility appear to have failed that test. Let's hope this doesn't become a national trend.

The Commodification of Airport Security Access

2007-01-30T21:23:00.000-08:00

Just a few thoughts concerning the recent trend to sell priority access to federal screening at U.S. airports. Whether we're talking about airline sponsored preferred customer lanes or new 'Registered Traveler' arrangements, both seem to be selling the same thing, priority access to a government provided service we all pay the same for. I'm familiar with TSA's explanation that they don't control access up to the checkpoints, that the airport determines the order in which people approach. I've yet to hear a rational explanation for that. Every person buying a ticket pays the exact same flat-rate fee, the so called 9/11 tax, on their ticket to fund TSA. Everybody pays the same, so why are first-class and so called 'premium' passengers and others willing to pay an annual fee to a vendor permitted to jump to the head of the line? Since when did priority access to a public service become a commodity to be sold by third parties? I might feel differently if either the airport, airlines or Registered Traveler vendors were subsidizing the screening operation by paying for the additional screening staff that made priority handling possible without impacting the rest of us. The nearest thing to this practice I can think of are the first-class and premium lanes at airline ticket counters. Offering priority access to your own product or service, however, is a far cry from selling access to someone elses product or service. This is a business model that works for everyone but the majority of the travelling public.

Isn't it odd that even as we pride ourselves as Americans on our egalitarian security policies, where everyone is subjected to the same screening procedures without regard to position or social status, we feed those checkpoints based on who has the most scratch or frequent flyer miles?

Registered Traveler vendors are also fond of saying, "It ends up shortening the lines for everyone", but rarely explain how. The truth is the impact on wait times for passengers in non-RT lines is minimal, at best. RT subscribers, after being processed through their separate (typically much shorter) vendor provided lines, are then escorted to the head of normal screening lines where they are processed just like everyone else. The only difference is that they are not normally subjected to secondary screening (but that's not guaranteed and most people aren't subjected to it anyway). From a Non-RT passengers point of view, standing in the regular line, having people constantly being allowed to cut in front of you in line would likely prove to be irritating and would probably not leave them with the impression that RT was helping to move their line along faster.

I say, if you want priority access, you need to be paying a premium to the provider of the product or service at the end of that line. The British permit airlines at UK airports to pay for additional Customs and Immigration staff in order to provide 'premium' access for their best customers. That seems only fair.

What we have now with our current system are airports and airlines selling something they don't own (a place in a line to a service they don't provide) and to which all passengers are equally entitled... first-come, first-serve access to a service we all pay the same for.

Part of the attraction for airports is that many are being offered a piece of the RT vendors financial pie.

What's next, airports selling priority access to Starbuck's in the concourses, allowing 'premium' travelers to cut to the head of the line for a cup of joe?

I hope it never comes to that.

Aviation Security: An Interesting History

2006-12-07T22:59:00.000-08:00

Of the many stories dealing with aviation security since 9/11, the following may help provide some historical perspective on the subject:

U.S. Foresaw Terror Threats in 1970s
http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg33588.html

America Should Federalize Its Airport Security (Jan. - 2000)
http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg04725.html

Airport Security Before 9/11
http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg26221.html

Cost must be no object to future of aviation security, says Jane's editor
http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg17049.html

Harsh light shines on airline security companies
http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg17188.html

FAA, airlines failed to use security rules (Oct. - 2001)
http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg17564.html

Airport Security to Weigh Risks Before Ordering Evacuations

Selective Memory?

2006-10-03T01:33:00.000-07:00

Monday, October 2, 2006

Rumsfeld, Ashcroft said to have received warning of attack
By Jonathan S. Landay, Warren P. Strobel and John Walcott
McClatchy Newspapers

WASHINGTON - Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and former Attorney General John Ashcroft received the same CIA briefing about an imminent al-Qaida strike on an American target that was given to the White House two months before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

The State Department's disclosure Monday that the pair was briefed within a week after then-National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice was told about the threat on July 10, 2001, raised new questions about what the Bush administration did in response, and about why so many officials have claimed they never received or don't remember the warning.

One official who helped to prepare the briefing, which included a PowerPoint presentation, described it as a "10 on a scale of 1 to 10" that "connected the dots" in earlier intelligence reports to present a stark warning that al-Qaida, which had already killed Americans in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and East Africa, was poised to strike again.

Click here for the entire article.

'On Native Soil'

2006-08-23T01:26:00.000-07:00

On Native Soil - The Documentary

Narrated by Academy Award� winners Kevin Costner and Hilary Swank, "On Native Soil" thoughtfully details the personal stories of tragedy and triumph that led to the formation of the 9/11 Commission and the publication of the Commission's landmark report. From miraculous individual feats of survival to the final recommendations to make America safer, this moving documentary features never-before-seen interviews from families directly touched by the tragedy and those on the commission, including Senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman, former top-level FBI and CIA counterterrorism officials, and many others. Produced by Jeff Hays Films for Court TV.

'Your Government Failed You'

2006-08-23T00:28:00.000-07:00

Richard Clarke Apologizes To Families Of 9/11 Victims

"Your government failed you, those entrusted with protecting you failed you, and I failed you."

Former White House counterterrorism adviser Richard Clarke
CBS News/Associated Press

WASHINGTON, March 24, 2004 - The government's former top counterterrorism adviser opened his testimony before the 9/11 commission Wednesday with a dramatic apology to families of the victims of the terror attacks.

"Your government failed you, those entrusted with protecting you failed you, and I failed you," Richard Clarke said, turning to family members in the audience.

Clarke, who served as the chief adviser on terrorism in both the Clinton and Bush administrations, said Mr. Bush didn't see al Qaeda as an urgent threat.

Clarke told the bipartisan panel investigating the Sept. 11 attacks that while President Clinton had "no higher priority" than combating terrorism, President Bush made it "an important issue but not an urgent issue.�

Clarke said that "although I continued to say it (terrorism) was an urgent problem I don't think it was ever treated that way" by the current administration in advance of the strikes two and a half years ago.

Clarke slid into the witness chair for widely anticipated testimony just days after publishing a book that criticized Mr. Bush's response to the threat of terrorism. (The book's publisher and CBSNews.com are both owned by Viacom). The White House has sharply criticized the book and mounted a counteroffensive against its author.

The white-haired former government official spoke after the commission released a written report saying that confusion about the scope of the CIA's authority to kill Osama bin Laden had hampered efforts to eliminate the man who heads al Qaeda. The result was a continued reliance on local forces in Afghanistan that had scant chance of success, the commission said.

"The commission needs to ask why that strategy remained largely unchanged throughout the period leading up to 9-11," the report said.

But Clarke drew sharp questioning from Republican commissioners, who said his pointed criticism of Bush officials in his book contradicted his praise for the administration's policies as late as fall 2002.

"I hope you resolve that credibility problem, because I hate to see you shoved aside in the presidential campaign as an active partisan trying to shove out a book," said John Lehman, the former Navy secretary who now is chairman of J.F. Lehman & Co., a private equity firm.

Clarke responded that he was not working for Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry and had no political motivations.

"I will not accept any position in the Kerry administration should there be one," he said, adding that he voted Republican in the 2000 election.

The commission's report said that officials from Mr. Clinton's National Security Council had told investigators the CIA had sufficient authority to assassinate al Qaeda members.

But it also said that agency officials, including CIA Director George Tenet "told us they heard a different message. � They believed the only acceptable context for killing bin Laden was a credible capture operation."

Sandy Berger, who served as Mr. Clinton's national security adviser, testified that the former president gave the CIA "every inch of authorization that it asked for" to carry out plans to kill bin Laden.

"If there was any confusion down the ranks, it was never communicated to me nor to the president, and if any additional authority had been requested I am convinced it would have been given immediately," Berger said in nationally televised testimony before the panel.

Tenet, who preceded Berger in the witness chair, was asked about the issue.

"I never went back and said, 'I don't have all the authorities I need,"' he replied.

"If I felt that I had developed access or capability that required dramatically different authorities, I would have gone in and said, 'This is what I have, this is what I think I can do; please give me these authorities,' and I don't doubt that they would have been granted," Tenet said.

The CIA director, whose tenure has spanned both the Clinton and Bush administrations, praised aides to both presidents for their attentiveness to terrorism. "Clearly there was no lack of care or focus in the face of one of the greatest dangers our country has ever faced" after the Bush administration took office, Tenet said.

He also said unambiguously the nation should be prepared for another attack.

"It's coming. They are still going to try and do it, and we need to sort of � men and women here who have lost their families have to know that we've got to do a hell of a lot better," he said. His remarks brought applause from members of victims' families seated in the audience.

The two days of hearings were remarkable by any account.

Secretaries of state and defense from the two administrations testified on Tuesday, followed on the second day by senior officials who served alongside them in a budding era of terrorism that finally struck home two and a half years ago.

Several members of the commission, including its Republican chairman Thomas Kean, complained through the day about the witness who wasn't there � President Bush's national security adviser Condoleeza Rice. She has talked to the panel privately, but the members wanted her public testimony, something the White House refused to allow.

Remember the 1990 Presidential Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism?

2006-07-17T00:07:00.000-07:00

Wednesday, May 16, 1990
Laxity by Pan Am, FAA Blamed in Jet Bombing
By Don Phillips and George Lardner Jr.
The Washington (DC) Post

A presidential commission yesterday placed much of the blame for the 1988 terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 on a "seriously flawed" aviation security system, beginning with inept and confused Pan Am security at Frankfurt and London and compounded by the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to enforce its rules.

"The destruction of Flight 103 may well have been preventable," the commission said.

Click here for the rest of the article.

Airline Security & Short Memories

2006-07-13T00:46:00.000-07:00

"I think a greater challenge for all of us is the experience in the aftermath of Pan Am 103, when we all believed that the nature of aviation security had been changed forever and people would adapt and would accept any burden. It wasn't a year afterward, after the new legislation had been enacted that airlines, airports, other interest groups were lobbying against tougher regulations, keeping public acceptance of inconvenience, intrusiveness into their lives at a high level is the challenge for an open democratic society. Maybe this time, maybe if we call the surcharge fund the September 11 fund and remind people every day that our vigilance can never be lowered, that we'll be able to sustain a high level of acceptance and participation and willingness by the public to continue to travel and accept the inconveniences."

REP. JAMES OBERSTAR (D-MN)
September 27, 2001 Interview Conducted by Ray Suarez on PBS's The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer

Remember the Gore Commission?

2006-06-16T21:28:00.000-07:00

In mid-1996, President William Jefferson Clinton created the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security and assigned it three specific mandates: to look at the changing security threat, and how the US could address it; to examine changes in the aviation industry, and how government should adapt its regulation of it; to look at the technological changes coming to air traffic control, and what should be done to take advantage of them.

In the wake of concerns over the crash of Trans World Airlines Flight 800, President Clinton asked the commission to focus its attention first on the issue of security. He asked for an initial report on aviation security in 45 days, including an action plan to deploy new high technology machines to detect the most sophisticated explosives.

From its inception, the commission took a hands-on approach to its work. President Clinton announced the formation of the commission on July 25, 1996 and a few days later, Vice President Al Gore, commission chairman, led a site visit to Dulles International Airport where he and other commissioners saw airport and airline operations firsthand, and discussed issues with front line workers. This was the first of dozens of such visits. Over the next six months, the commission visited facilities throughout the United States and in various locations abroad. It was a dog-and-pony show of immense size and scope.

The Gore Commission held six public meetings, hearing from over fifty witnesses representing a cross section of the aviation industry and the public, including families of victims of air disasters. Recognizing the increasingly global nature of aviation, the commission cosponsored an International Conference on Aviation Safety and Security with the George Washington University, attended by over 700 representatives from sixty-one countries

There were a number of recommendations made by the Gore Commission, whose commissioners included family members of the victims of Flight 800. The recommendations included several measures to improve screening company performance, including a national job grade structure for airport security screeners and meaningful measures to reward employees. It also called for airlines to contract out to security companies on the basis of performance, not the lowest bidder.

The Gore Commission called for criminal background and FBI fingerprint checks for all airport and airline workers who screen passengers for weapons or have access to secure areas. The airlines industry had long opposed mandatory criminal checks.

Two weeks later, as reported in the Boston Globe, Gore retreated from his own commission's proposals in a letter to Carol B. Hallett, president of the industry's trade group, the Air Transport Association.

''I want to make it very clear that it is not the intent of this administration or of the commission to create a hardship for the air transportation industry or to cause inconvenience to the traveling public,'' Gore wrote.

To reassure Hallett, Gore added that the FAA would develop ''a draft test concept ... in full partnership with representatives of the airline industry."

The day after Gore's letter to the Air Transport Association, Trans World Airlines donated $40,000 to the Democratic National Committee. By the time of the presidential election, other airlines had poured large donations into Democrat Party committees: $265,000 from American Airlines, $120,000 from Delta Air Lines, $115,000 from United Air Lines, $87,000 from Northwest Airlines, according to an analysis done for the Boston Globe by the Center for Responsive Politics, which tracks donations. A total of $627,000 was donated to the Democrats by major airlines.

Two of the commission members -- Victoria Cummock and Kathleen Flynn, who lost loved ones in the terrorist attack on Flight 800 -- believe that campaign contributions by the airline industry were a direct result of Al Gore backing away from the commission's security recommendations.

FAA, airlines failed to use security rules (Oct. - 2001)
http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg17564.html

Airport Security's Grand Illusion

2005-12-03T00:28:00.000-08:00

Wednesday, June 15, 2005

Column
Airport Security's Grand Illusion
By Anne Applebaum
The Washington (DC) Post

If you happen to be reading this while standing in one of those disturbingly
slow, zigzag lines at airport security -- looking repeatedly at your watch,
wondering if this time you really will miss the plane -- here's something to
make you feel worse: Almost none of the agony you are experiencing is making
you safer, at least not to any statistically significant or economically
rational degree. Certainly any logical analysis of the money that has been
spent on the airport security system since Sept. 11, 2001, and the security
that the system has created, must lead to that conclusion.

This is not to say that the uniformed screeners aren't more professional
than they were in the past or that their presence doesn't create a degree of
psychological comfort, both for government officials, who can claim to be
doing something to keep us all safer, as well as for those passengers who
continue to believe that engaging in ritualistic shoe-removal gives them
mysterious, magical protection against terrorism. On the grand scale of
things, though, that's all it is: magical protection.

Click on the link to read the complete article.

"Whistleblower says FAA willfully failed to fix security loopholes"

2005-11-27T02:02:00.000-08:00

Monday, February 25, 2002

Fear Of Flying
Whistleblower says FAA willfully failed to fix loopholes
CBS News

WASHINGTON, D.C. (CBS News) - Whistleblower Bogdan Dzakovic went public
Monday with allegations that thousands died needlessly on Sept. 11 because
his employer, the Federal Aviation Administration, willfully failed to fix
security loopholes. And what's worse, he says, nothing has changed.

"If by some fluke your flight was targeted by terrorists right now, chances
are they could do whatever they wanted to do," said Dzakovic, a current
member of the government's elite Red Team, which covertly tests airport
security.

Dzakovic routinely smuggled weapons and fake bombs past security
checkpoints, reports CBS News Correspondent Vince Gonzales.

"We could breach security 80 to 90 percent of the time with very little
problem before Sept. 11," Dzakovic said. And today? "I don't think we'd have
that much more of a problem."

Government officials, however, insist security is tighter now.

So CBS News went undercover through checkpoints at eight major airports
across the country to find out who's right.

We placed lead-lined film bags in carry-on luggage to show how dangerous
objects might be smuggled onto planes. The bags, routinely used by travelers
to protect film, can block x-rays from security scanners, even the latest
machines.

The film bags should be checked because the only way for screeners to know
for sure there's not a weapon or bomb inside is to open them. Which is why
our test results were so disturbing. About 70 percent of the time, no one
checked our film bags.

We easily got through JFK, Atlanta and Washington-Reagan airports. We went
through Baltimore three times, twice on the day after a Justice Department
high security alert.

In St. Louis, Los Angeles and New York's La Guardia, we got through once and
were stopped once at each airport. In Fort Lauderdale, screeners correctly
emptied the bag. At La Guardia, a supervisor explained why she searched it.

"We can't see through it," she said. "So we need to check it."

But twenty minutes later, at the same checkpoint, another screener let us
through without inspection.

"They didn't know what you were carrying. There could be anything in there,
a weapon, a gun, a grenade," said Steve Elson, a former FAA Red Team leader
who helped with our tests.

"To the American public, it appears that a lot is being done," said Elson.
"But in fact it really isn't. And the very simple and more dangerous items
are getting through, as we've seen during our time at the airport.

Dzakovic says inspectors have reported major security vulnerabilities and
inadequate training of screeners for years, but he claims FAA officials
ignored the problems.

"It was a disaster waiting to happen, and myself and other individuals
desperately tried to have this stuff fixed before Sept. 11," he said. "And
absolutely nobody paid any attention."

Click on the link below to read the complete February 2002 CBS News report:

Fear Of Flying

Have you ever been asked to violate or ignore safety and or security regulations at the request of someone senior to you?
	Yes, but I refused
	No, but would if asked
	Yes
	No

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